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THE MIND AND THE HEART IN
THE CHRISTIAN EAST AND WEST
David Bradshaw

One of the most intriguing features of Eastern Orthodoxy is its understanding of the mind and the heart. Orthodox authors such as St. Gregory Palamas
speak of “drawing the mind into the heart” through prayer. What does this
mean, and what does it indicate about the eastern Christian understanding
of the human person? This essay attempts to answer such questions through
a comparative study of the eastern and western views of the mind and the
heart, beginning with their common origin in the Bible and continuing
through their later divergence.

Pascal famously declared that “the heart has its reasons, which reason
does not know.”1 This statement gives voice to a sense, widely shared in
our own time as in Pascal’s, that reason apart from the heart is somehow
radically incomplete. Yet although such a view has long been a commonplace, most of us would be hard pressed to say precisely what is meant by
either of the key terms, ‘reason’ or ‘the heart.’ We can begin to get some
purchase on this question by asking what they meant for Pascal. Like
many writing in the wake of the Scientific Revolution, Pascal understood
reason primarily in terms of its opposition to authority and tradition, as a
faculty for inferring truth that is responsible solely to the deliverances of
individual sensation and reflection.2 The suggestion made by his famous
dictum is that, contrary to the enthusiasms of the new philosophy and
science, the heart has a way of knowing that cannot be understood in
such terms.
What did Pascal mean by the heart? At times he seems to think of it as
the faculty of knowing a priori truths, such as that there are three spatial
dimensions and an infinite series of numbers, as well as that the great
majority of what we take to be our waking experience is not a dream.
Like Hume after him, Pascal thinks that our inability to prove such beliefs
should “serve only to humble reason, which would like to be the judge of
1
Blaise Pascal, Pensées, trans. A. J. Krailsheimer (New York: Penguin, 1966), no. 423 (translation slightly altered).
2
See particularly Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding IV.18.2: reason is “the discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths which the mind arrives
at by deduction made from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties; viz.
by sensation or reflection.”
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everything, but not to confute our certainty.”3 However, Pascal also identifies the heart as the organ of religious faith, and here he seems to have in
mind less a priori knowledge than an act of immediate perception. He defines faith as “God perceived by the heart, not by the reason,” and he says
that those who believe without first studying rational arguments “judge
with their hearts as others judge with their minds.”4 So in general the heart
for Pascal would seem to be a faculty of immediate, intuitive perception.
The trouble is that—as Pascal recognizes—this faculty is not infallible, for
those who “judge with their hearts” sometimes judge wrongly. That raises
a question which, so far as I can see, Pascal never adequately addresses.
How can the “reasons” discerned by the heart be properly assessed, without surrendering the independence of the heart as a means of knowing?
Or to put it another way, how can we give the heart its proper role without
betraying the imperatives of reason?
Pascal’s understanding of the heart is in some respects idiosyncratic,
for Pascal does not associate the heart in any particular way with emotion.
Far more typical is the view of his younger contemporary, the duc de la
Rouchefoucauld, who in his Maxims presents the heart as the seat of the
passions. La Rouchefoucauld’s view is that “the head is always the dupe of
the heart,” a maxim he elaborates through hundreds of biting observations
about human posturing, self-deception, and vainglory.5 Despite their differences, Pascal and La Rouchefoucauld have in common an association of
the heart with feeling, understood broadly as including both intuition and
emotion, along with a suspicion that reason is systematically unwilling or
unable to give such feeling its due. To judge from popular culture, this suspicion is still very much with us. The heart is ubiquitous in popular music,
as it is also in a great deal of literature, poetry, and religious expression.
Yet philosophers and scientists—whom we may take for present purposes
as the spokesmen of reason—rarely even mention the heart, save in casual
metaphors or when speaking strictly of the physical organ.
Of course, to observe that the split between the head and the heart
which troubled Pascal is a characteristic feature of modern life is hardly
a new discovery. What has been less widely noted is that within eastern
Christianity there is also a dichotomy between the head and the heart, but
one that takes a very different form. Byzantine authors such as St. Gregory
Palamas (1296–1359) diagnose our current condition as one in which the
mind has been “dissipated abroad by the senses” and needs to be led back
into the heart. Far from representing feeling or emotion, the heart is here
the locus of reason in its proper form, in which alone it is fully responsive
to divine grace. As Palamas explains:
Pascal, Pensées, no. 110.
Ibid., nos. 424 and 382; cf. discussion in Philippe Sellier, Pascal et Saint Augustin (Paris:
A. Colin, 1970), pp. 128–136.
5
See François duc de la Rouchefoucauld, Maxims, trans. Leonard Tancock (New York:
Penguin, 1959); the quoted maxim is no. 102.
3
4
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Our heart is the place of the rational faculty, the first rational organ of the
body. Consequently, when we seek to keep watch over and correct our reason by a rigorous sobriety, with what are we to keep watch, if we do not
gather together our mind, which has been dissipated abroad by the senses,
and lead it back again into the interior, to the selfsame heart which is the seat
of the thoughts? This is why the justly named Macarius [i.e., “blessed one,”
a patristic author] immediately goes on to say, “It is there one must look to
see if grace has inscribed the laws of the Spirit.” Where but in the heart, the
controlling organ, the throne of grace, where the mind and all the thoughts
of the soul are to be found?6

There is much here that seems strange from a western standpoint, beginning with the assertion that the heart is “the first rational organ of the
body.” The very notion of leading the mind back into the heart would make
little sense for an author such as Pascal or La Rouchefoucauld, for whom
the division between mind and heart is a fixed feature of our nature rather
than something potentially subject to transformation. Nonetheless, the
notion that the mind has been “dissipated abroad by the senses” surely
has some intuitive appeal, and the idea that grace has inscribed the laws
of the Spirit on the heart is straightforwardly Biblical (II Cor. 3:3). Furthermore, Palamas does not speak for himself alone, but for a long tradition
that remains vigorous up to the present day. There is thus good reason
both to seek to understand his view of the mind and the heart and to take
it seriously as an alternative to that of our own culture.
My aim in this paper is two-fold. First, I will seek to describe the development of these two different ways of understanding the mind and the heart,
beginning with their origins in Biblical and classical antiquity. As we shall
see, both originated in the attempt to synthesize Biblical and classical ways
of thought, although the synthesis took quite different forms in each case.
Second, I hope that an indirect result of my exposition will be, at least to
some extent, to commend the eastern view. I believe that this view has two
important advantages over its western counterpart: first, it is closer to the
outlook of the Bible, and especially to the Bible’s psychosomatic holism; and
second, it offers what are, so far as I can judge, legitimate and effective means,
not only of diagnosing the split between the mind and the heart, but of overcoming it. Granted that the means are not easy, they nonetheless offer real
hope in an area where constructive proposals have been notably lacking.
I
First let us review what the mind and the heart signify in the Bible. Of the
two the heart is probably the more perplexing, so I will take it first.
The Hebrew word generally translated ‘heart’ (lēb and its cognates) occurs over eight hundred times in the Old Testament.7 In its broadest sense it
6
Gregory Palamas, Triads I.2.3; trans. Nicholas Gendle, Gregory Palamas: The Triads (New
York: Paulist Press, 1983), p. 43.
7
For this statement and much of what follows I am indebted to Hans Walter Wolff, Anthropology of the Old Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), pp. 40–58. See also Theological
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designates the hidden, inaccessible core of something; thus one finds “the
heart of the sea” to indicate the depths of the sea, and “the heart of heaven” to indicate its unattainable heights.8 Far more frequently, of course, it
indicates the deep and inaccessible core of the human person. Occasionally the reference is straightforwardly physical, as when Joab “took three
darts in his hand, and thrust them through the heart of Absalom” (II Sam.
18:14).9 But more often it is to what we would call the psychic, emotional,
or spiritual core, as when Absalom “stole the hearts of the men of Israel,”
or David, having put down the rebellion, bowed down their hearts to himself (II Sam. 15:6, 19:14). Plainly in the latter sort of case there is no direct
reference to anything physical, although an echo of the physical remains
in the association of the heart with something deep, abiding, and decisive,
rather than superficial or transitory.
There is also a third sort of case, one that falls between these two extremes. To remain for a moment with the story of David, after David sneaks
up on Saul and cuts off the fringe of his robe, “David’s heart smote him,
because he had cut off Saul’s skirt” (I Sam. 24:5). Plainly the heart is here
an organ of understanding and feeling, but it is also something physical,
whose guilt and contrition David feels as a physical blow. Again, when
Abigail returns home after making an elaborate gift to David against the
wishes of her husband Nabal, “Nabal’s heart was merry within him, for he
was very drunken: wherefore she told him nothing . . . until the morning
light. But it came to pass in the morning, when the wine was gone out of
Nabal, and his wife had told him these things, that his heart died within
him, and he became as a stone” (I Sam. 25:36–37). Here the heart is first the
subject of merriment, an emotional state, and then undergoes a straightforwardly physical process, that of dying.10 The author does not seem to feel
any tension between the two; for him it is the same heart which does both.
More broadly, a wide range of Biblical idioms seem to indicate primarily an
emotional or cognitive state or process, but to localize it within the physical
organ. These include a heart that is hot (Deut. 19:6), a heart that is hard (Ex.
Dictionary of the New Testament, ed. Gerhard Kittel (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1967), “kardia,” vol. 3, pp. 605–613; Encyclopedia Judaica (New York: Macmillan, 1971), “Heart,” vol. 8, p.
7; Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament, ed. G. Johannes Botterweck et al. (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1995), “lēb,” vol. 7, pp. 399–437.
8
Deut. 4:11, Ps. 46:2, Ezek. 28:8, Jonah 2:3; cf. Wolff, Anthropology, p. 43.
9
Biblical quotations are from the King James Version. There is a complication in that Absalom does not actually die until Joab’s henchmen finish him off (v. 15), so that lēb here would
seem to refer to the breast rather than heart (see particularly the Encyclopedia Judaica article
cited above). Nonetheless there are other verses where it almost certainly refers to the organ
we call the heart, as when it is paired with the kidneys (e.g., Ps. 7:9, 26:2, 73:21). More importantly, both the Septuagint and the Vulgate translated lēb by terms (kardia and cor, respectively) whose anatomical reference is solely to the heart. Readers in both the Greek and Latin
traditions accordingly understood the term in its physical references as having to do solely
with that organ, and it is in that form that the concept has shaped Christian thought.
10
I follow here the traditional interpretation that Nabal suffered a heart attack followed by
some form of coma or paralysis. (According to the following verse, he died ten days later.)
For an interesting alternative view, see Marjorie O’Rourke Boyle, “The Law of the Heart: The
Death of a Fool (I Samuel 25),” Journal of Biblical Literature 120 (2001), pp. 401–427.
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7:3, Josh. 11:20), a “broken heart” (Ps. 34:18, 51:17), a trembling heart (Deut.
28:65), a heart that is fat (Is. 6:10), “strength of the heart” (Jdg. 19:5, Ps.
73:26), “pouring forth” the heart (Ps. 62:8, Lam. 2:19), a heart that trembles
(I Sam. 4:13, 28:5), and a heart that “bubbles up” from within (Ps. 45:1).
The heart, then, is the deepest part of our being, both physically and
mentally. Because it is deep it is hard to know, and indeed can be known
fully only by God. Jeremiah exclaims, “the heart is deceitful above all
things, and desperately wicked: who can know it?” He then answers his
own question, “I the Lord search the heart, I try the reins, even to give
every man according to his ways, and according to the fruit of his doings”
(Jer. 17:9–10).11 The depth and unknowability of the heart mean not only
that people often are a mystery to one another, but even that they can
be a mystery to themselves. In the book of Isaiah, God complains of the
Israelites that they “draw near me with their mouth, and with their lips
do honor me, but they have removed their heart far from me” (29:13).
His complaint is not precisely that the Israelites are hypocrites, for it is
quite likely that they believe that they are serving Him as they ought; it is
rather that, despite their words and their conscious thoughts, they are far
removed from Him in the deepest core of what they are. Another striking
example is when Daniel, in explaining to Nebuchadnezzar the meaning of
a dream, states that God has revealed it to him (Daniel) “that thou mightest know the thoughts of thy heart” (Dan. 2:30); in other words, it is Daniel’s role as prophet to unfold to Nebuchadnezzar the content of his own
heart. Jesus’ lapidary statement, “where your treasure is, there will your
heart be also” (Matt. 6:21) is, among other things, a warning that one can
be damnably mistaken about the contents of one’s own heart.
The notion that the heart is deep and hard to know is still a familiar
one today. In fact we tend to speak of the heart, rather than the mind or
soul, precisely when we have in mind that which is deeply hidden within.
However, in so doing we generally have in mind especially the realm of
“feeling,” as in Pascal and La Rouchefoucauld. In the Bible, by contrast, the
heart has no particular connection with the emotions, but is also the seat
of reason, will, and desire. In fact the Bible draws little distinction among
these different functions. The book of Proverbs commands, “O ye simple, understand wisdom: and, ye fools, be ye of an understanding heart”
(8:5). The context makes plain that to be of an “understanding heart” is
not primarily a matter of mental acuity, but of the possession of rightly
ordered intentions and desires. The reason that this is seen as a form of
understanding is that for them to be rightly ordered requires that they be
formed in light of the knowledge of God, so that knowledge and rightly
ordered desire go hand in hand. Many other similar passages could be
cited, such as the prayer of King Solomon, “Give therefore thy servant an
11
See also I Sam. 16:7, I Kings 8:39, II Chron. 6:30. In the New Testament the sense that
God alone knows the human heart is so strong that it leads to the coinage of a new term,
kardiognōstēs, “knower of hearts” (Acts 1:24, 15:8).
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understanding [literally: listening] heart to judge thy people, that I may
discern between good and bad” (I Kings 3:9).12
It is in light of both the depth of the heart, and its holistic integrity,
that we can understand the supreme importance of a heart that is rightly
ordered. When in Jeremiah God promises of the Israelites, “I will give
them an heart to know me” (24:7), He means not primarily that they will
know about God, but that they will know Him in a direct and personal
way by obeying His commandments. Thus the heart can have a more or
less receptive condition, insofar as it is or is not responsive to God. The
psalmist prays that God will “enlarge my heart” and “incline my heart
unto thy testimonies” (Ps. 119:32, 36). In Ezekiel the change between these
two states is put in terms of an actual replacement of the heart: “I will take
the stony heart out of their flesh, and will give them an heart of flesh: That
they may walk in my statutes, and keep mine ordinances, and do them:
and they shall be my people, and I will be their God” (11:19–20).13 A “heart
of flesh” is not only one that is healthy and functioning properly, but one
that is readily moved rather than being cold and insensitive. Without such
a heart any real communion between man and God is impossible.
Let us turn now to the mind, where there are again important differences between the Biblical and modern understandings. There is no term in
ancient Hebrew with a semantic range similar to that of ‘mind’ in English,
although lēb (heart), nepesh (soul), and rūah (spirit) all overlap it to some extent.14 More immediately relevant for our purposes is the Greek term nous,
the most common term for mind in the New Testament, and one that is central to the later Greek tradition. It bears a range of meanings: mind, reason,
understanding, thought, judgment, resolve, and disposition.15 The best way
to get a handle on this variety is to think of its meaning as related in various
ways to the act of understanding. Specifically, it ranges from: (a) the faculty
of understanding, to (b) the characteristic way that faculty is exercised, to (c) a
particular act of its exercise, to (d) the virtue of exercising it well. For example,
when St. Paul quotes from the Greek translation of Isaiah, “Who has known
the mind (nous) of the Lord?” (I Cor. 2:16), he would seem to be referring to
(c), the specific content of the divine mind. When he then goes on to declare
triumphantly, “But we have the mind of Christ,” he probably refers instead
to (b), a characteristic way of thinking. He may hint as well that we share
12
Gerhard von Rad offers an interesting comment on this passage: “What he [Solomon],
the paradigm of the wise man, wished for himself was not the authoritative reason which
reigns supreme over dead natural matter, the reason of modern consciousness, but an ‘understanding’ reason, a feeling for the truth which emanates from the world and addresses
man. He was totally receptive to that truth, but this was not passivity, but an intense activity,
the object of which was response, prudent articulation. . . . The Solomon of I Kings 3 could—
regarded objectively—have said that he would yield to Yahweh so that the world might not
remain dumb for him but that it might be understood by him.” Gerhard von Rad, Wisdom in
Israel (London: SCM Press, 1972), pp. 296–297.
13
This promise is substantially repeated at 36:26–27.
14
See Wolff, Anthropology of the Old Testament, pp. 10–58.
15
See the Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, “nous,” vol. 4, pp. 951–960.
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in (a), Christ’s very faculty of understanding, since otherwise to share in his
way of thinking could be merely a temporary or accidental fact.
For our purposes there are two important points to notice. The first is
that, because of this range of meanings, nous does not stand in opposition
to feeling or emotion in the same way as does ‘mind’ in English. Paul often
attaches to it a moral character, speaking of a “fleshly mind” (Col. 2:18),
a “corrupt mind” (I Tim. 6:5, II Tim. 3:8), a mind that is defiled (Titus
1:15), or a mind that has been tested and found unworthy (Rom. 1:28).16
He does not refer here merely to failings of intellect, but to a habitual
tendency to think and feel in ways that are self-serving or debased. There
is also at least one place where nous has a purely positive connotation,
Romans 7:23, where Paul speaks of “the law of my mind” that opposes
the law of sin in his members. Here nous would seem to mean the faculty
of understanding specifically insofar as it is correct and true. This passage
is particularly noteworthy, for it seems to echo the usage of nous among
philosophical authors, for whom (as we shall see) nous is a faculty specifically fitted for communion with God. It thus offers a bridge between the
Biblical and philosophical meanings of the term, one that would later be
taken advantage of by the Greek Fathers.
Nonetheless—and this is the second point—in the New Testament the
predominant emphasis remains that our current, fallen nous is in need of
transformation. The same text which speaks of “the law of my mind” also
includes the command, “be not conformed to this world, but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind (nous)” (Rom. 12:2). The “renewing
of the mind” is here not so much a new intellectual ability as a practical
understanding of the will of God that is effective in the sphere of action.
Elsewhere Paul directs his audience to “be renewed in the spirit of your
mind (nous), and . . . [to] put on the new man, which after God is created
in righteousness and true holiness” (Eph. 4:23–24). Here, too, the renewal
of the mind is a thoroughgoing transformation that brings one into conformity with the divine will.
This quick survey already makes it plain that the Biblical contrast between the heart and the mind is not at all that between feeling and thought.
It is rather that between the core of what we are and our phenomenal consciousness, composed as it is of thoughts, emotions, feelings, and desires,
whether habitual or transitory. One final point that needs clarifying is the
different ways in which the heart and the mind respond to God. Both of
them can be more or less pure, and both are in need of transformation; yet
how this is true is different in each case, and the difference is important
for their later history.
The fact that the heart is a physical organ which we do not see, but
whose power wells up from within, not only makes it deep and hard to
know; it also makes it capable of receiving mysteries in a way that the conscious mind is not. We have noted, for example, how the Psalmist prays
16

That is the literal meaning of adokimos, translated in the K.J.V. as ‘reprobate.’
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for a heart that is inclined toward God, and Ezekiel prophesies that the
Israelites will be given hearts of flesh. Perhaps the most striking instance
of the heart as an organ of spiritual receptivity is an episode in the book
of Jeremiah. Jeremiah has been placed in the stocks and publicly ridiculed
for his prophecies. Since it was his attempt to obey God that brought him
to this point, he places the blame for what has been done to him squarely on God: “O Lord, thou hast deceived me, and I was deceived: thou
art stronger than I, and hast prevailed: I am in derision daily, every one
mocketh me” (20:7). He then adds that he had resolved to speak God’s
word no more, but the word itself would not allow him: “Then I said, I will
not make mention of him, nor speak any more in his name. But his word
was in mine heart as a burning fire shut up in my bones, and I was weary
with forbearing, and I could not stay [i.e., refrain from speaking]” (20:9).
His word was in mine heart as a burning fire shut up in my bones. The heart is
here not only a metaphor for the deepest level of his being; it is also the
physical organ itself, one that Jeremiah’s conscious mind cannot escape or
overrule, however much he might wish to do so.
The New Testament also gives prominence to the heart as an organ of
spiritual receptivity. After the birth of Jesus, Mary “kept all these things
and pondered them in her heart” (Luke 2:19). The word translated ‘pondered’ is sumballousa, “drawing together.” Mary draws all that she has
seen and heard into her heart, where its meaning will unfold, not so much
intellectually, as by her continual act of living in light of it. Later in the
same Gospel, after Jesus appears to his disciples on the road to Emmaus,
they exclaim to one another, “Did not our heart burn within us, while he
talked with us by the way?” (24:32). Here too it is the heart that recognizes
and receives the mysteries that Jesus reveals. The fact that as it does so it
“burns” indicates that the heart is here still a unity which is at once physical, emotional, and cognitive.
St. Paul likewise presents the heart as the point of our being that is
in most immediately open to God. He speaks of God as giving “the earnest of the Spirit in our hearts” (II Cor. 1:22), as having “shined in our
hearts” (II Cor. 4:6), and as having “sent forth the Spirit of his Son into
your hearts” (Gal. 4:6), and he describes the Christians in Corinth as an
epistle “written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God; not in
tables of stone, but in fleshy tables of the heart” (II Cor. 3:3). Like Luke, he
understands the heart as capable of receiving and understanding mysteries in a way surpassing the mind. Thus he prays for the Ephesians that
“the eyes of your heart be enlightened, that ye may know what is the hope
of his [God’s] calling, and what the riches of the glory of his inheritance
in the saints” (Eph. 1:18), and later he urges them not to be like those who
are “alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them,
because of the hardness of their heart” (4:18).17
17
I have modified the translation of the first verse, where the K.J.V. renders kardia as “understanding.”
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In speaking of the heart as an organ of spiritual receptivity, I mean to
emphasize its physical character. In this it contrasts with the mind, which
is instead (as in Paul’s teaching about the renewal of the mind) a faculty of
spiritual receptivity. The difference is that, as an organ, the heart is part
of our physical make-up, something that we did not choose and cannot
readily change. Indeed it is so deep within us that we do not fully know
its contents or understand what it utters. Only God, who “searches the
heart,” is capable of knowing it fully and reaching into the depths to transform it. The mind, as the level of conscious awareness, is more immediately subject to our control, but is also subject to self-deception. All of this
means that if the heart has received the Spirit of God, as prophesied in the
Old Testament and proclaimed by St. Paul, then if the mind is alienated
from the heart, it will also be alienated from God.
II
Obviously much has intervened in the two thousand years between St.
Paul and us to change this understanding. One might think that the decisive event was the discovery by William Harvey that the heart is a pump,
along with the rise of a mechanistic approach to the body in authors such
as Descartes and LaMettrie. In fact, however, decisive steps away from a
Biblical psychology had already been taken long before, and the events
of the seventeenth century, important though they were, merely crystallized an existing line of development. In brief, the story I shall tell is one in
which the early Christian Fathers already were rather far from the Biblical
categories, for they read the Bible through Hellenistic lenses. In the West
this initial direction was never reversed, although there were a number
of further twists and turns before arriving at the situation we find today.
In the East there was a reversal, thanks to the influence of an anonymous
Syrian monk known as Pseudo-Macarius. The East did not adopt a purely
Biblical psychology, however, but interwove with it some further ideas
drawn from Greek philosophy. Thus each tradition has a rather complex
story. Although it will not be possible here to recount either in detail, I
shall attempt to point out their important milestones.
First a word about the Hellenistic lenses. There were, broadly speaking, two views of the heart in the classical Greek tradition.18 Plato gives
it a fairly minimal role. His most important dialogues about the soul, the
Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Republic, scarcely even mention it. There is more in
the Timaeus, for there Plato maps the three parts of the soul onto the body,
with reason being seated in the head, passion in the chest, and appetite
in the region of the stomach. The role of the heart is to act as the agent of
passion, which in turn is to be governed by reason, so that when things
go correctly the heart communicates the dictates of reason throughout the
18
For a more detailed account see Antoine Guillamont, “Les sens des noms du Coeur dans
l’antiquité,” Le Coeur (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1950), pp. 41–81, especially pp. 51–61; C. R. S.
Harris, The Heart and the Vascular System in Ancient Greek Medicine, from Alcmaeon to Galen
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).
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entire body (70b). Yet passion can also overheat the heart, and so the gods
placed next to it the lungs to act as a cooling agent (70c–d). Plato’s identification of the head as the seat of reason and the heart as the seat of the
passions was followed by Galen, among others, and so found its way into
the mainstream of medieval thought.
The other view was that of Aristotle and the Stoics. Aristotle, observing
that the heart is the first organ to form in embryos, concluded that it directs
the embryo’s subsequent development. He also regarded it as the “primary sense organ,” the place where impressions derived from all the senses
converge and are unified into a coherent picture of the world. Finally, in
at least some texts he made the heart the seat of the soul itself.19 The Stoics held a similar view, teaching that the heart generates the other bodily
parts and that it is the seat of the hēgemonikon, the ruling part of the soul.20
The identification of the heart as the seat of intelligence and of the ruling
part of the soul was also adopted by the Epicureans and by the pseudoHippocratic treatise On the Heart, written in the third century B.C.21
Thus there were in the classical tradition two views of the heart, one
associating it primarily with the passions and the other primarily with
reason (although not to the exclusion of the passions). Importantly, however, neither view presents the heart as something deep or mysterious,
nor as a person’s true self, the place of an intimate communion with God.
To the extent that Greek thought had any place for such notions, it assigned them instead to the intellect or soul. It is not surprising that early
Christian authors, seeking to interpret the Biblical concept of the heart
in a way that would be intelligible to the Greco-Roman world, did so
in terms of these categories. Origen, for example, explicitly identifies the
heart as it is spoken of in Scripture with intellect (nous).22 St. Gregory of
Nyssa similarly identifies it with soul or intelligence (dianoia).23 That is
not to say that these authors had no use for the actual Biblical language
regarding the heart, which they were happy to adopt as metaphor; in
interpreting the metaphor, however, they found the heart as a physical
organ to be irrelevant.
19
Aristotle’s references to the heart are scattered throughout his scientific works; see The
Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995), pp. 137, 163, 187–188; or in more detail Harris, The Heart and the Vascular System,
pp. 121–176. The texts locating the soul in the heart appear to be at odds with the De Anima,
where the soul has no specific location because it is the form of the body.
20
See A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987), vol. 1, sections 53D, G, and U, with further references in TDNT, vol.
3, pp. 608–609.
21
See Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers X.66; Lucretius, On the Nature of
Things III.136–142; Hippocratic Writings, ed. G. E. R. Lloyd (New York: Penguin, 1978), p. 351.
22
Origen, On First Principles I.1.9, Against Celsus VI.69; cf. Guillaumont, “Les sens,” pp.
68–69.
23
Gregory of Nyssa, On the Song of Songs VII (PG 44 937d), VIII (949C), cited in Guillaumont, “Les sens,” pp. 71–72. Note also the sixth of Gregory’s Homilies on the Beatitudes, where
to be “pure in heart” is to “remove evil from the very choice of the will”; Gregory of Nyssa,
The Lord’s Prayer, The Beatitudes (New York: Newman Press, 1954), p. 151.
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Broadly speaking, this pattern remained in place among the Latin Fathers. Perhaps no one has explored the poetic force of the Biblical language
of the heart more powerfully than St. Augustine. The Confessions famously
opens with the declaration, “Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our hearts
are restless till they find rest in Thee.”24 Much of the subsequent story is
told in terms of the turmoil, humiliation, contrition, and exaltation of Augustine’s heart. The heart is the “inner dwelling place” where Augustine
stirs up tumult against his own soul; it is “what I am inwardly” and the
place “where I am whatever I am.”25 As the inner self, it is also where God is
most deeply active and where one’s response to Him must be made. Augustine remarks of his gradual recovery of belief, “little by little, Lord, with a
gentle and most merciful hand you were working upon and composing my
heart.”26 Likewise, in the famous rapture at Ostia, Augustine and Monica
attain their fleeting contact with divine Wisdom by straining “all the effort
of our heart.”27 Nonetheless, when Augustine wishes to be literal he invariably glosses the meaning of ‘heart’ by a more philosophical term such as
soul (anima), mind (mens), or will (voluntas).28 His own extensive psychological investigations, both in his early works and the late On the Trinity, are
almost exclusively in terms of such categories, with virtually no reference
to the heart.
A perusal of the long entries for cor in the Thesaurus Linguae Latinae and
the Mittellateinisches Wőrterbuch reveals that these identifications were not
unique to Augustine, but formed more or less the common assumption of
Latin readers of the Bible. Among later theologians it appears that the identification of the heart with the will was particularly favored. St. Anselm, St.
Bernard of Clairvaux, and St. Thomas Aquinas all make such an identification casually and without argument, in a way which suggests that they
saw it as a commonplace.29 Like Augustine, although they speak of the
heart readily, they give it no place within their developed psychology.
The identification of the heart with the soul, mind, or will, however,
does not yet explain how it came to have the predominant association
with feeling that we find today. In part this reflects the continuing use of
the term for the physical organ, which these various philosophical identifications certainly did not erase. The Platonic and Galenic view of the
heart as the seat of the passions also played a role. However, the real turnAugustine, Confessions I.1.
Ibid., VIII.8, X.3; cf. further references in Guillaumont, “Les sens,” pp. 72–74; and Goulven Madec, “Cor” in Augustinus-Lexicon, ed. Cornelius Mayer (Basel: Schwabe, 1986), vol. 2,
col. 1–6.
26
Ibid., VI.5.
27
Ibid., IX.10.
28
See respectively On the Trinity X.7(9), Sermon 265C, and Unfinished Work against Julian
II.220. Augustine does not attempt to harmonize these various suggestions; presumably he
held that some Biblical texts refer to one of the three, and some to others.
29
Anselm, On Truth 12, On the Concordance of God’s Foreknowledge, Predestination, and Grace
with Human Freedom III.2; Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermons on the Song of Songs 42.4.7; Aquinas,
Summa Theologiae IaIIae Q. 24, art. 3, IIaIIae Q. 44, art. 5; cf. IIaIIae Q. 7, art. 2, obj. 1.
24
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ing point appears to have occurred in the twelfth century, when western
Europe saw a new preoccupation with intensity and vividness of feeling,
both secular (as in the courtly love movement) and religious. Of particular
importance for the latter was the “affective mysticism” pioneered by St.
Bernard of Clairvaux. As Andrew Louth has observed, Bernard’s mysticism differs from that of Augustine in the sharp contrast it draws between
knowledge and love, and its classification of love as an affectio, a feeling.30
Since love is a feeling, and love for God is of paramount importance, the
pursuit of feeling for its own sake took on a central role. What this implied for the heart can be seen in a passage from Bernard’s homilies on
the Song of Songs. Adopting a traditional motif, Bernard sees the wound
in Christ’s side as opening up a passage to the depths of his heart; more
than earlier authors, however, he gives what is thus laid open a distinctly
sentimental cast:
The iron pierced his soul, and his heart has drawn near to us, that no longer
should he not know how to show compassion on my woes. The secrets of his
heart lie open to me through the cloven body. . . . Why should not the heart
lie open through the wounds? For what shines out more surely from Thy
wounds but the truth that ‘the Lord is sweet and merciful and full of pity’?31

The new kind of emotional intimacy enabled by the passage to Christ’s
heart is illustrated by the case of a martyr: “The martyr stands fearless and
in triumph, though his body be torn. While iron pierces his side he watches, not only with strength but with joy, the blood that pours out from his
flesh. Where then is the soul of the martyr? It is safe; it is on the rock; it is
in the heart of Jesus, whose wounds were opened to let it in.”32
In the decades following Bernard, the devotion to Christ’s heart took
on increasingly vivid forms. A number of female saints, beginning with
a Cistercian nun, St. Lutgarde of Aywières (1182–1246), experienced visions in which Christ literally removed their heart and replaced it with his
own.33 Others had other visions of comparable intensity, such as that of St.
30
“For Augustine . . . the soul’s love of God and the soul’s knowledge of God go together:
the soul wants to know God more and more because it loves him, and loves him because
it knows that he is supreme Truth and Beauty. Love and knowledge of God are united in
the kind of knowledge we have of God, namely, wisdom, sapientia. Sapientia, in contrast to
scientia, ordinary knowledge, is concerned with eternal reality and contemplation of it. . . .
With Bernard, however, there is a sharp contrast between knowledge and love, for love is not
primarily a desire for possession and delight in possessing, as with Augustine, but a feeling.
Amor est affectio naturalis, una de quattor—‘Love is a feeling, one of four’ (the others being fear,
joy, and sorrow). . . . When he contrasts sapientia and scientia he is not contrasting a higher
intellectual activity with a lower, but a feeling which delights in the good and finds it sweet,
with an intellectual activity.” Andrew Louth, “Bernard and Affective Mysticism” in The Influence of Saint Bernard, ed. Benedicta Ward (Oxford: SLG Press, 1976), pp. 2–10, at p. 3.
31
Bernard of Clairvaux, Homilies on the Song of Songs 61 (PL 184 1070), translated in Margaret Williams, The Sacred Heart in the Life of the Church (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1957),
p. 34 (translation adapted).
32
Ibid., Williams, The Sacred Heart, p. 35.
33
See Williams, The Sacred Heart, pp. 47–50, 59, 115–116; Andre Cabassut, “Changement
des Coeurs,” Dictionnaire de Spiritualité (Paris: Beauchesne, 1953), vol. 2, col. 1046–1051.
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Gertrude of Helfta (1256–1302), who saw “a stream of honey coming forth
from the heart of Jesus, and distilling itself into hers.”34 I will not discuss
these visions in detail, but it is likely that such stories, and the growing
devotion to the Sacred Heart which they exemplify, did much to fix in
the popular mind the association of the heart with feeling. When the discovery that the heart is a pump was made in the seventeenth century, the
stage was set for the bifurcation between the objective and scientific heart,
which is nothing more than a physical organ, and the heart of popular
imagination, which is the seat of sentiment, emotion, and intuition.
III
Now let us turn to the Christian East. Undoubtedly the two most important sources for the eastern view of the mind and heart were two authors
of the late fourth century, Pseudo-Macarius and Evagrius.
Pseudo-Macarius was an anonymous Syrian monk whose homilies circulated in antiquity under the name of St. Macarius the Egyptian, one of
the Desert Fathers.35 Since they are still known as the Macarian Homilies,
I shall refer to him as “Macarius” for short. Macarius has a vivid Biblical
sense of the heart as the center of the human person and the place where
divine grace is imparted. Alluding to II Corinthians 3, he writes:
Divine grace writes on the ‘tables of the heart’ the laws of the Spirit and
the heavenly mysteries. For the heart directs all the organs of the body, and
when grace gains possession of the heart, it rules over all the members [of
the body] and the thoughts. For there, in the heart, the mind (nous) abides
as well as all the thoughts of the soul and all its hopes. This is how grace
penetrates throughout all parts of the body.36

Macarius adopts here the Aristotelian-Stoic view of the heart as the seat
of the soul and organ of thought. He reasons that, since the heart is the
ruling organ of the body, it communicates to the entire body the grace
that it receives. Of course this is true only insofar as grace is present, for
Macarius is well aware that the heart is capable of evil as well as good. For
the heart to be governed by grace depends on both our own effort and the
free gift of God. Macarius illustrates by likening the heart to a garden: just
as a gardener must work hard while at the same time looking to heaven
for rain, we too must “work the soil of the heart by free deliberation and
hard work,” while recognizing that without grace our labors can bring
34
Life and Revelations of Saint Gertrude (London: Burns, 1870), 414, cited in Williams, The Sacred Heart, p. 51. Another closely related development was that of the literary motif in which
one person eats the heart of another, sometimes as punishment for adultery, and sometimes
intentionally as an indication of deep emotional exchange; Dante, for example, reports in La
Vita Nuova a vision wherein a figure whom Dante identifies as Love compels Beatrice to eat
Dante’s flaming heart. See Milad Doueihi, A Perverse History of the Human Heart (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 19–62.
35
See the Introduction to Pseudo-Macarius: The Fifty Spiritual Homilies and the Great Letter,
ed. and trans. George Maloney (New York: Paulist Press, 1992).
36
Homilies 15.20; tr. Maloney, p. 116, modified. For the Greek text see Die 50 Geistlichen Homilien Des Makarios, ed. H. Dörries, E. Klostermann, and M. Kroeger (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1964).
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nothing.37 Later he again uses the metaphor of a garden, but this time with
an emphasis on vigilance against evil thoughts. The heart, he says, is like
an enclosed garden outside of which is a fast-moving river. If the river eats
away the foundations of the wall, the wall will be destroyed and the garden flooded. “So it is also with man’s heart. It has good thoughts, but the
rivers of evil are always flowing near the heart, seeking to bring it down
and draw it to its own side. If the mind should be turned ever so little
toward frivolity and yield to unclean thoughts, look out—the spirits of error have roamed the pastureland and have entered and have overturned
there the beautiful things.”38 We note here that the mind’s natural home
is within the heart, but it can also be drawn astray and dissipated by evil
thoughts, thereby overthrowing the heart’s natural integrity.
Evagrius is not as directly Biblical as Macarius. Although he was a
friend of St. Basil the Great and St. Gregory Nazianzen, the greatest influence on his thought was Origen. Like Origen, he thinks of our embodied
condition as a fall from an earlier state of unity with God, and accordingly
he gives the body little positive role in prayer. Prayer is “communion of
the intellect (nous) with God.”39 To attain it one must first seek dispassion
(apatheia) through traditional monastic and ascetic practices, regarding
which Evagrius offers a great deal of practical direction. Even so, “one
who has attained dispassion has not necessarily achieved pure prayer. For
he may still be occupied with thoughts which, although dispassionate,
distract him and keep him far from God.”40 Hence one must also seek the
aid of God, “who gives prayer to him who prays.”41 Evagrius explains:
While all else produces thoughts, ideas and speculations in the intellect
through changes in the body, the Lord does the opposite: by entering the
intellect, He fills it with whatever knowledge He wishes; and through the
intellect He calms the uncontrolled impulses of the body.42

Thus, although Evagrius sometimes speaks of pure prayer as a movement
beyond all thoughts (noēmata), what he actually seems to have in mind is
a state in which the intellect possesses only thoughts imparted directly
by God. Nous when it is thus in direct communion with God becomes the
“place of God” and the “throne of God.” It is occupied by no specific form
or image, but has a direct awareness (aisthēsis) of God, accompanied by a
passionate desire (erōs) for Him.43
Homilies 26.10; tr. Maloney, p. 167.
Homilies 43.6; tr. Maloney, p. 221, slightly modified.
39
Evagrius, On Prayer 3; translation in The Philokalia, trans. G. E. H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, and Kallistos Ware (London: Faber and Faber, 1979 – ), vol. 1, p. 57. For the Greek text
see PG 79, 1165–1199 (where, however, the numbering of chapters is slightly different).
40
Ibid., 56; tr. Philokalia, vol. 1, p. 62.
41
I Samuel 2:9 LXX, cited in On Prayer 59.
42
Evagrius, On Prayer 64; tr. Philokalia, vol. 1, p. 63.
43
See the texts cited and discussed in Columba Stewart, “Imageless Prayer and the Theological Vision of Evagrius Ponticus,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 9 (2001), pp. 173–204,
especially pp. 189–201.
37
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It is plain that the role Evagrius assigns to nous goes well beyond anything in the New Testament. Its lineage is philosophical, with roots in texts
such as the Divided Line passage of the Republic, where nous is the faculty that apprehends the Forms, and the Charioteer myth in the Phaedrus,
where the charioteer of the soul (who leads the soul toward intelligible
reality) is nous.44 Likewise in Aristotle, one thinks of the special role assigned to nous in apprehending first principles, as well as the observation in the Nicomachean Ethics that a person’s nous is his true self, and the
identification in Metaphysics Lambda of nous with God.45 For both authors,
nous is both a person’s true self and the element within the person that has
the greatest innate affinity to God. Although this is not the predominant
Biblical meaning of the term (apart from Romans 7:23), nonetheless it was
embraced by many of the Greek Fathers, including the Greek Apologists,
Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Athanasius, and Gregory Nazianzen.46 Of
course a Christian also has to be mindful of the Pauline teaching regarding
the fallenness of the nous and the need to be “transformed by the renewing
of your mind.” Hence these authors frequently add that it is only when
the nous is purified and restored to its natural condition that it can apprehend God. Evagrius is solidly within this tradition in teaching that prayer
is an act of the nous, but that pure prayer requires the nous to be purified
of the passions and inspired by the Holy Spirit.
Macarius and Evagrius together bequeathed a rich legacy to the later
tradition. It was not long before their ideas were synthesized into a comprehensive view incorporating both the heart and the intellect. (I shall use
‘intellect’ to translate nous in the sense given it by Evagrius.) The primary
author of this synthesis was St. Diadochus of Photike, a bishop who wrote
around the mid-fifth century.47 Diadochus’s teaching can be approached
most readily through his understanding of the consequences of the Fall.
According to Diadochus, the Fall divided the perceptive faculty originally
planted within Adam into two, one part directed toward sensual and bodily pleasures, the other responsive to the guidance of intellect. The trouble
is that intellect has also been corrupted, so it now habitually produces evil
thoughts as well as good.48 This calls for a response that can be summarized
Plato, Republic VI 511d; Phaedrus 247c.
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II.19 100b5–17; Nicomachean Ethics VI.6 1141a3–8, IX.8
1168b28–1169a18, X.7 1177b26–1178a7; Metaphysics XII.7 1072b14–30.
46
See, for example, Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 4.1; Origen, Against Celsus VI.69, On
First Principles II.8.3, II.11.7 (assuming that mens here translates nous); Athanasius, Against the
Heathen 2.3–4, 30.3; Gregory Nazianzen, Orations 28.17, Epistle 51, with further references in G.
W. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), s.v. nous I.C.1a, 5a–c.
47
A fuller history would have to include several other authors also represented in volume 1
of the Philokalia, especially Mark the Monk (early fifth century), who may have been a source
for Diadochus’s teaching on baptism; see Kallistos Ware, “The Sacrament of Baptism and the
Ascetic Life in the Teaching of Mark the Monk,” Studia Patristica 10 (1972), pp. 441–452.
48
See Diadochus of Photike, On Spiritual Knowledge pp. 24–25, 29, 88, translated in Philokalia, vol. 1. For the Greek text see Diadoque de Photicé, Oeuvres Spirituelles (Paris: Éditions du
Cerf, 1955).
44
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under three headings. In the first place, the perceptive faculty must be unified by learning “persistently to be detached from the good things of this
world,” so that it becomes wholly responsive to intellect.49 This requires
disciplining the senses through fasting and other forms of self-denial;
struggling to endure suffering patiently and with joy; learning not to judge
others or return evil for evil; and, if possible, selling one’s goods to give to
the poor.50 Yet such labors will be of no value if the intellect remains divided. Hence, in the second place, there is also need for divine grace, for only
the Holy Spirit can purify the intellect of its evil inclinations.51 The grace
that is needed is in a sense already given at baptism; however, it remains
“hidden in the depths of the intellect, concealing its presence even from the
perception of the intellect itself.”52 It hides in this way because God wishes
to honor our free will and so He is “waiting to see which way the soul
inclines.”53 Only when there is human effort does the hidden grace become
active, so that “in a mysterious way, by means of intellectual perception,
grace communicates something of its riches to his soul.”54
That brings us to the third aspect of Diadochus’s teaching. Although
grace is given at baptism and becomes fully active through the love of
God, God does not impel us without our free cooperation. Thus one must
continuously and ardently seek grace, and do everything in one’s power
to cooperate with its working. For Diadochus this means especially guarding the intellect through the constant invocation of “the glorious and holy
name of the Lord Jesus.”55 The intellect has a need for activity which leads
it to “dissipate” itself abroad, whether through the beguilements of the
senses, or excessive talking, or even—paradoxically enough—through
listlessness and despair.56 According to Diadochus:
When we have blocked all its outlets by means of the remembrance of God,
the intellect requires of us imperatively some task which will satisfy its need
for activity. For the complete fulfillment of its purpose we should give it
nothing but the prayer “Lord Jesus.” “No one,” it is written, “can say ‘Lord
Jesus’ except in the Holy Spirit” (I Cor. 12:3). Let the intellect continually
concentrate on these words within its inner shrine with such intensity that it
is not turned aside to any mental images . . . . For when the mind (dianoia) is
closely concentrated upon this name, then we grow fully conscious that the
name is burning up all the filth which covers the surface of the soul; for it is
written, “Our God is a consuming fire” (Deut. 4:24).57

Ibid., p. 29; tr. Philokalia, vol. 1, p. 261.
Ibid., p. 42–43, 54, 63–66.
51
See Ibid., p. 28.
52
Ibid., p. 77; tr. Philokalia, vol. 1, p. 279.
53
Ibid., p. 85; tr. Philokalia, vol. 1, p. 285.
54
Ibid., p. 77; tr. Philokalia, vol. 1, p. 279.
55
Ibid., p. 31; tr. Philokalia, vol. 1, p. 261.
56
See Ibid., pp. 55–58, 68, 70, 96.
57
Ibid., p. 59; tr. Philokalia vol. 1, p. 270.
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One whose intellect is thus recollected and unified through the constant
invocation of Jesus comes to “dwell continually within his own heart.”58
The heart is, as it were, the home of the intellect, and the intellect is
the deepest center of the heart. Diadochus illustrates their relationship
through an analogy:
When a man stands out of doors in winter at the break of day, facing the
east, the front of his body is warmed by the sun, while his back is still cold
because the sun is not on it. Similarly, the heart of those who are beginning
to experience the energy of the Spirit is only partially warmed by God’s
grace. The result is that, while their intellect begins to produce spiritual
thoughts, the outer parts of the heart continue to produce thoughts after
the flesh, since the members of the heart have not yet all become fully conscious of the light of God’s grace shining upon them. . . . But when we begin
wholeheartedly to carry out the commandments of God, all our organs of
perception will become fully conscious of the light of grace; grace will consume our thoughts with its flames, sweetening our hearts in the peace of
uninterrupted love.59

Although Diadochus does not speak explicitly of “drawing the mind into
the heart,” plainly the idea is already present. By thus returning the intellect to its home within the heart, what I referred to earlier as the faculty of
spiritual receptivity comes again to be centered in the organ of spiritual
receptivity, where God especially imparts the gift of grace.
Macarius, Evagrius, and Diadochus together present most of the elements of what later came to be known as the “hesychast” tradition (from
hēsychia, silence). These include the identification of the heart as the ruling organ of the body; the belief that the intellect is naturally centered in
the heart, but has been dissipated through the senses and the passions;
the emphasis on overcoming this dissipation by guarding one’s thoughts
and constantly invoking the Lord Jesus; and, not least, a recognition of
the continuous subtle interplay of human effort and divine grace. Two
other elements were later added which crystallized the tradition into its
final and mature form. One was the expansion of the simple invocation,
“Lord Jesus,” into the more expansive “Lord Jesus Christ, son of God,
have mercy on me,” found from around the sixth century onward.60 This
fuller form and its variants—sometimes without “son of God,” sometimes with the addition of the final words, “a sinner”—are known as the
Jesus Prayer.
The other new element was the use of physical techniques in accompaniment with the Jesus Prayer to aid the intellect in returning to the heart.
Although the Jesus Prayer was from an early date synchronized with the
act of breathing, with the aim that the name of Jesus would accompany
every breath, the association of such techniques with the movement of the
Ibid., p. 58; tr. Philokalia vol. 1, p. 270, slightly modified.
Ibid., p. 88; tr. Philokalia vol. 1, p. 287.
60
See Kallistos Ware, “The Jesus Prayer in St. Gregory of Sinai,” Eastern Churches Review 4
(1972), pp. 3–22, at pp. 12–13.
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mind into the heart appears to have been made first only toward the end
of the thirteenth century, among the monks of Mount Athos in Greece.61
As an example we may quote this instruction from St. Gregory of Sinai:
Sitting from dawn on a seat about nine inches high, compel your intellect to
descend from your head into your heart, and retain it there. Keeping your
head forcibly bent downwards, and suffering acute pain in your chest, shoulders, and neck, persevere in repeating noetically or in your soul “Lord Jesus
Christ, have mercy.” . . . Restrain your breathing, so as not to breathe unimpededly; for when you exhale, the air, rising from the heart, beclouds the
air and ruffles your thinking, keeping the intellect away from the heart. . . .
But restraining your breathing as much as possible, and enclosing your intellect in your heart, invoke the Lord Jesus continuously and diligently, and
you will swiftly consume and subdue them [i.e., evil thoughts and other
distractions], flaying them invisibly with the divine name.62

The purpose of coordinating prayer, posture, and breathing in this way is
not only that the intellect come to dwell in the heart; it is also that the prayer
become “self-acting,” so much a part of one’s being that it continues even
in the midst of other activities. Perhaps the most vivid description of such
a state is that in The Way of a Pilgrim, the memoir of an anonymous Russian
peasant who devoted his life to the practice of the Jesus Prayer. The author
writes, “I had the feeling that the prayer had, so to speak, by its own action
passed from my lips to my heart. That is to say, it seemed as though my
heart in its ordinary beating began to say the words of the prayer within at
each beat. Thus for example, one, ‘Lord,’ two, ‘Jesus,’ three, ‘Christ,’ and so
on. I gave up saying the prayer with my lips. I simply listened carefully to
what my heart was saying. . . . Further there came into my heart a gracious
warmth which spread through my whole breast.”63
Since The Way of a Pilgrim is anonymous one cannot be sure to what
extent it may be fictionalized or embellished (although it has been widely
accepted as truthful). Let me complement it by a more recent account by a
person of some prominence, the Elder Cleopa Elie (1912–1998) of Sihastria
Monastery in Romania. This remarkable man was for many years a shepherd and simple monk before his unexpected elevation as abbot. He soon
was recognized by the Communist government as a highly effective, and
therefore dangerous, spiritual leader. After many years of persecution, ultimately, with the fall of the Ceausescu government, he came to be widely
regarded throughout Romania as a modern-day starets.64 The following is
from an account of his imprisonment in 1948:
61
See Kallistos Ware, “Praying with the Body: The Hesychast Method and Non-Christian
Parallels,” Sobornost 14 (1992), pp. 6–35, especially pp. 9–10.
62
Gregory of Sinai, “On Stillness: Fifteen Texts,” 2, tr. Philokalia, vol. 4, p. 264; cf. the discussions of this passage in Ware, “Jesus Prayer,” pp. 14–15, and “Praying with the Body,” p. 16.
63
The Way of a Pilgrim and The Pilgrim Continues His Way, trans. R. M. French (New York:
Harper), pp. 19–20.
64
See Archimandrite Ioanichie Balan, Elder Cleopa of Sihastria (Lake George, Colorado:
New Varatec Publishing, 2001).
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For five days he sat in a cement basement and was continuously questioned,
while the Securitate shined bright electrical lights into his eyes. There was no
bed and he was not allowed food or water. Fr. Cleopa would later recall this
method of interrogation: “Later, I asked Fr. Marcu [who also was imprisoned]
why they put so many lights in my eyes. I’d put my hands over my eyes so the
light would no longer beat down. . . . It seemed as if it entered my brain! My
brain hurt! They wanted me to lose my memory so that I’d no longer speak.”
He would also later reveal to his close disciples how he was able to endure
this torture: “Whoever would enter there would depart nearly crazy. They
also put me there so that I would lose my mind. I could no longer see with my
eyes and could not bear the heat. Then I descended with my mind into my
heart with the Prayer of Jesus. After an hour they took me out and were all
amazed that I could still speak and move without anyone holding me.”65

Extraordinary although this story may be, it is in a sense emblematic of the
role that hesychast spirituality has played within the Orthodox church.
The great flowering of hesychasm on Mount Athos occurred just as Byzantium was entering its final military and political decline. If one asks
how Orthodoxy was able to survive, first in Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria
under the Turks, and later in Russia and the Slavic lands under successive
waves of the Mongol conquest, westernization, and Communism, a large
part of the answer must be the role played by hesychasm in keeping alive
a simple and direct form of personal sanctity.66
Nonetheless, the intense concentration involved in such techniques,
and exceptional claims made on their behalf, have raised in some the suspicion that they are no more than a form of self-hypnosis.67 Although a
full examination of this question is beyond our scope here, it is surely relevant to note that such techniques are normally not practiced in isolation,
but are part of a comprehensive way of life. Every teacher of hesychast
prayer emphasizes that physical techniques are of value only when they
are accompanied by fasting, vigils, frequent confession, strict obedience
to a monastic elder or other experienced guide, and careful watchfulness
over one’s thoughts, as well as an attitude of deep contrition and devotion
to Christ.68 Such teachers also emphasize that for the prayer to become
self-acting is not an automatic consequence, but a gift given only when
God wills. Often, as for the Russian pilgrim, it is not so much the summit
of spiritual progress as a stage along the way, one that may be followed
by many further struggles.
65
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For a survey of this history see John Meyendorff, St. Gregory Palamas and Orthodox Spirituality (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1974), pp. 127–72.
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All of these are points that would have to be carefully developed in any
full discussion of hesychasm. I merely touch on them here because our interest is less in the hesychast tradition itself than in what such practices reveal about the eastern Christian view of the mind and the heart. If nothing
else, quotations such as those just offered make it plain that in speaking of
the heart as “the first rational organ of the body,” the hesychasts really do
mean the heart as a bodily organ. However, they find in this organ levels
of spiritual potential that are quite foreign to the heart as it is understood
in the West. Likewise, they find in the mind a capacity for return to the
heart that, from a western standpoint, seems equally foreign.
IV
What are we to make of these two quite different ways of viewing the mind
and the heart? It is probably best to begin by recognizing that, in light of
the enormously varied histories and associations of both terms, any global
understanding of what they mean must necessarily be an interpretation.
By this I mean not only that it is a particular way of construing the facts,
but that it involves a choice regarding which facts to regard as relevant.
In the present case, the modern western view is that, if one is interested
in the literal meaning of the mind and the heart, then the relevant facts are
those accessible to scientific observation as well as, in the case of the mind,
introspection. This view certainly recognizes that there are other aspects to
the heart’s cultural meaning, but it sees them as irrelevant to the heart as a
bodily organ. The East, by contrast, takes the relevant range of facts to consist in the phenomenological reality of our emotional, cognitive, and spiritual lives, particularly as they are described within Biblical and patristic
sources. Science has a role to play, but it is the subordinate one of identifying the material structures that underlie our lived experience.69 One advantage of approaching both views historically, as we have done here, is that it
highlights the extent to which both are the products of complex and largely
contingent factors. The West’s sharp distinction between the literal and the
metaphorical heart is hardly self-evident, but came about only because of
the way a certain type of Biblical exegesis and literary and spiritual development dovetailed with early modern science. Likewise the East’s particular understanding of the mind and the heart does not simply fall out from
the Bible, nor even from the Bible plus the early Church Fathers, but has
been formed by many centuries of spiritual and ascetic struggle.
Despite their differences, both views are attempts to recognize what truly
exists—to “divide reality at the joints,” in Plato’s phrase—and they overlap
sufficiently so that fruitful dialogue between them ought to be possible. In
this final section I would like to consider two objections that might be raised
against the eastern view. One is that the hesychasts wrongly conceive of
the mind as a quasi-material entity, one that cannot exist without material
69
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localization, whether it be in the head or the heart.70 Another—and probably
the one that most readily occurs from a modern western standpoint—is that
their view is based on an outmoded physiology, including an ignorance of
the crucial role played by the brain and the nervous system in serving as a
basis for thought.71 Addressing these concerns will take us some distance toward seeing to what extent, if at all, the eastern view remains viable today.
In an important passage, Gregory Palamas explains that properly speaking the mind is incorporeal, so that it is present in the heart, “not confined
. . . as in a container,” but instead “as in an instrument.”72 He almost certainly means to allude here to the long discussion of this point in St. Gregory of
Nyssa’s On the Making of Man.73 Chapter 12 of that work considers in detail
the opposing views which placed the rational part of the soul in the head
and the heart. It sees some merit in both, since the former has in its support the fact that thinking is impeded when the brain is damaged, and the
latter the fact that the passions are felt especially in the heart. Yet, Gregory
argues, neither view is correct, for since the mind is incorporeal it is equally
in contact with all the parts of the body. The sensation of passion in the
heart can be explained as due to various bodily mechanisms (for example,
the heating of the blood accompanying anger), and the fact that damage to
the brain impedes thinking can be explained as due to the brain’s diminished capacity to receive the influence of the mind. It is to illustrate the latter point that Gregory introduces the analogy with an instrument:
since the whole body is made like some musical instrument, just as often
happens in the case of those who know how to play but are unable because
of the unfitness of their instrument . . . so too the mind, passing over the
whole instrument and touching each of the parts in a mode corresponding to its intellectual activities . . . produces its proper effect on those parts
which are in a natural condition, but remains inoperative and ineffective
upon those which are unable to admit the movement of its art.74

Something similar also happens in sleep, when the mind is “hidden by the
inactivity of the senses” and so is not able to operate through them fully,
but instead has only a “smouldering activity.”75
This is an objection raised by Guillaumont, “Les sens des noms du Coeur,” pp. 79–80.
I wish to thank H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. and Mark Cherry for particularly pressing
this objection.
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The view of Palamas is not quite identical to this, for he does think that
there is a clear sense in which the mind’s natural and proper home is the
heart. Nonetheless, he agrees that the mind is incorporeal and is present
in the body only as in an instrument.76 In what sense, then, is the heart its
natural home, and what does it mean to speak of the mind as “gathered
together” and “led back” into the heart? The answer is that in such a process the mind learns to use its bodily instrument differently, focusing its
activities within the heart rather than dissipating them abroad through the
senses, and that in so doing the two achieve—or rather, return to—their
natural relationship. As an analogy we might consider the different ways in
which a beginner and an expert horseman are related to the horse on which
they ride. The actions of the beginner are dispersed, erratic, and ineffectual,
leaving the horse more in control than the rider; those of the expert are
measured and precise, conveying exactly the direction needed in light of
the rider’s knowledge both of his own goal and of the horse’s innate abilities and tendencies. In a sense the beginner and the expert are both equally
present to the horse, but in another sense the expert is far more present,
for he is effectually present in a way that the beginner is not. Likewise the
experienced rider sits more “naturally” upon the horse, the two having
achieved through long practice a unity of feeling and response, whereas
the beginner seems by contrast like so much dead weight. In a similar way,
the mind can come to be effectually present to the heart, enabling the two
to act as a unity in their natural and proper relationship, even while in another sense it remains equally present throughout the entire body.
This clarification enables us to see how the two objections can be answered. Since Palamas (the most authoritative spokesman for the hesychasts)
explicitly affirms that the mind is immaterial, the charge that the hesychasts
conceive of the mind as quasi-material is simply misinformed. As for the
claim that their view cannot withstand modern discoveries about the neural basis of the mind, everything depends on what is meant by “basis.” If it
could be shown that neural activity produces thought, then Palamas’s view,
along with most other forms of mind-body dualism, would be discredited.
But it is hard to see how this could be shown, since empirical evidence furnishes only correlations between mental and neural events, and the interpretation of these correlations always remains a further question. Palamas’s
view is that the mind uses the brain and nervous system as instruments;
that there would be correlations between brain states and mental states is
therefore hardly surprising. He also believes that the mind uses the heart
(and, for that matter, other organs) as instruments, but in a different way.
The heart is the deepest center of personality and the place most intimately
76
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touched by divine grace, yet the mind’s presence to it is tenuous and clumsy. The hesychasts’ goal is to overcome this inner dislocation. There is no
reason why such a change need affect the mind’s way of using other organs
such as the brain, any more than someone’s learning to ride a horse must
affect his way of using other tools such as a lasso or a gun.
We thus come to the perhaps surprising conclusion that the psychosomatic holism of the eastern view depends upon mind-body dualism.
It remains legitimately a form of holism, however, in at least two key respects. One is that it takes seriously the phenomenology of the heart as
it is articulated within the Bible and patristic tradition. It thus retains the
holistic outlook of the Bible itself, although within a framework in which
key elements are also drawn from Greek philosophy. The second is that it
sees the return of the mind into the heart as a way in which grace comes
to be present, not to the mind alone, but to the entire body. This idea is
present already in Macarius and the other Desert Fathers, and is fully articulated by Palamas:
Just as those who abandon themselves to sensual and corruptible pleasures
fix all the desires of their soul upon the flesh, and indeed become entirely
“flesh,” so that (as Scripture says) “the Spirit of God cannot dwell in them,”
so too in the case of those who have elevated their minds to God and exalted
their souls with divine longing, their flesh also is being transformed and
elevated, participating together with the soul in the divine communion, and
becoming itself a dwelling and possession of God.77

The deification of the flesh is a central theme in Greek patristic theology,
one that we cannot enter into fully here.78 Suffice to say that it adds to the
phenomenological holism of the East a further ethical or teleological holism, in that the goal of earthly life is to begin here and now the process by
which the whole person, body and soul, comes to be deified.
In sum, the eastern tradition presents a holistic practical stance toward
our bodily condition that is made possible, in part, by an ontological dualism. Such a combination is surprising from the standpoint of traditional
western philosophy. Nonetheless it seems both coherent and plausible, at
least given Christian presuppositions; and it offers real hope that the mind
and the heart need not always stand apart, but can in fact be reunified.79
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